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1. 
‘The Rating Game: The Conservative Party and the Politics 
of Local Taxation in London, 1880-1900’ 
CONSERVATIVES AND LOCAL TAXATION 
Writing in 1867, Lord Salisbury concluded, Cassandra-like, that the consequences of 
franchise reform would be to elevate the question of taxation onto ‘the field upon which 
the contending classes of this generation will do battle’.1 The 1867 Reform Act had 
replaced the causal link between income-tax payment and the vote, so beloved of 
Gladstone, with a householder - or ratepaying - franchise. The payment of rates was 
therefore elevated into a constitutional signifier; an assertion to national as well as local 
political citizenship Two years later, the passage of the Municipal Franchise and 
Assessed Rates Acts in 1869 quadrupled the local electorate and amplified such 
concerns.2 Another reviewer, writing on the eve of further franchise reform, ominously 
warned that ‘all the political power will be on one side; nearly all the taxation will be on 
the other’.3 J. G. Hubbard, the veteran City MP, even called for rateable value rather than 
population to form the basis of redistribution, warning that ‘they were multiplying the 
representatives of a class who paid no taxation whatever’.4 Although fiscal questions 
were not directly at the forefront of political controversy until the Edwardian period, they 
formed a ubiquitous subplot which underlay assumptions about the role of the state and 
the workings of the economy.5  
To understand the modalities of taxation questions in London it is first necessary to 
delineate in detail the contours of national taxation policies and debates. Local taxation 
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was a fundamental dynamic of late-Victorian politics, which by the 1880s had supplanted 
earlier debates about the impact of indirect taxation upon the working classes. According 
to Martin Daunton’s comprehensive account, ‘attitudes to the incidence of local taxation  
on different forms of income and property formed an ideological fault-line between 
parties’.6 Avner Offer has powerfully demonstrated the vortex of local taxation in the 
Edwardian period and the political crisis it engendered.7 As a proportion of GNP, central 
expenditure actually fell from 12 per cent in 1850 to 9 per cent by 1890. However, local 
demands rose from 14 per cent to 34 per cent of total taxation between 1820 and 1914, 
showing that the extension of ‘state’ power in the late nineteenth century was mainly 
localised, and the responsibility of municipal authorities rather than central government.8 
One of the leading campaigners for relief of local taxation, the Conservative agriculturist 
Massey Lopes, bemoaned, with some justification, ‘how careful were we as a nation in 
jealously guarding our imperial taxation, but how entirely indifferent and apathetic about 
our local taxation’.9 This growth in municipal revenue was largely accidental, attached to 
the creaking rating system with no genuine attempt at wholesale reform, allowing the 
Times to observe that ‘local government is a chaos and local taxation a scandal’.10 As a 
result of this systemic weakness, the question of imperial and local taxation necessitated 
a political response that tested the adaptive ability of political parties to appeal to diverse 
and competing constituencies. 
Underlying traditional Gladstonian finance was the belief that the economy was a 
self-correcting, autopoieitic system which required minimal interference. Following Peel, 
a scrupulous balance was required between direct and indirect taxation, or as Robert 
Lowe put it, ‘as a general rule reductions in one class of taxation should be accompanied 
by reductions in another’.11 A transparent demarcation between local and central finances 
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was seen as desirable, to encourage retrenchment and instil fiscal responsibility, a view 
articulated in radical discourse from the Chartists onwards.12 Control over local taxation 
was an essential element to the rational, participative self-governing democracy 
expounded by John Stuart Mill.13 The orthodox view of local taxation was, according to 
Edward Hamilton’s evidence to the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, that payment 
should be ‘in proportion to the benefit receive[d] therefrom’, as opposed to the principle 
of ability to pay which he ascribed to imperial taxation.14 Another Treasury official, 
George Murray, sought to draw an utilitarian distinction between ‘onerous’ rates (those 
required by the state) and ‘beneficial’ ones (those to the benefit of local taxpayers), 
arguing that only the latter were in fact rising.15 In so far as reform of local taxation was 
deemed necessary, a subject with which Gladstone avowed he was ‘rather 
uncomfortable’,16 it should be to the favour of the urban rather than the rural ratepayer. 
The preferred route of relief was a formal division of rates between the owner and 
occupier, a principle embodied in abortive bills introduced by George Goschen in April 
1871, and which officially remained part of the Liberal canon until the 1890s.17 For 
Liberals, any reform of local taxation could only be ventured after a democratization of 
local government, so preserving the requisite link between taxation and representation. 
Conservative departures from Gladstonian orthodoxy found expression in the 
detailed mechanics of taxation policy. Some Conservatives disagreed with the 
Gladstonian view of the immorality of indirect taxation, with its cherished populist 
vision of the ‘free breakfast table’, and argued instead that such taxes were the only 
means to instil fiscal discipline and responsibility amongst the masses. The income tax 
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may have been deeply controversial (although it contributed only £5.7m of a total 
Exchequer revenue of £77m in 1874)18 because of its allegedly inquisitorial nature, but 
for many on the right, direct taxation had the attraction of being raised on personalty as 
well as on realty. The chief Conservative grievance was the exemption from local 
taxation of personal property, or, as one election pamphlet put it, ‘only £1 in every £5 of 
the income of this rich country pays rates’.19 After 1868, Massey Lopes introduced annual 
parliamentary motions that called for personal property to be liable to rates, and in 1872 
his proposal was passed with a majority of 100.20 It was maintained that real property was 
not simply the province of the rich, but permeated well down the social scale to ‘the class 
of poor persons with only a small income derived from real capital’.21 Liberals on the 
other hand admitted the anomaly of local taxation, but claimed that this was corrected by 
imperial taxation – namely the income tax, and probate duties – which restored the 
balance between the taxation of personalty and realty.22 
Yet the political problem for the Conservative party lay in constructing a 
meaningful alternative policy without incurring the jibes of landed self-interest. After all, 
complaints about local taxation had traditionally been vociferously expressed by the 
agricultural sector, with Disraeli raising the banner of rate relief in the aftermath of 1846 
to try and wean the party from protectionism.23 The Local Taxation Committee was 
formed in 1869 to agitate for a reduction in the relative contribution of taxation on land, 
which was seen as overburdened. The Committee later accused the final Gladstonian 
ministry of ‘tenderness towards the urban ratepayer’.24 Such a viewpoint was vigorously 
contested. For instance, Henry Fawcett, the Liberal MP for Hackney, asserted that ‘land, 
in comparison with other kinds of real property, is contributing a continually diminishing 
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amount to local taxation’.25 However, from the early 1870s, leading Conservatives for 
urban constituencies also began to add their voices to the clamour for rate relief. During 
the 1873 budgetary debates, W.H. Smith, the MP for Westminster, proposed a motion 
which called for the readjustment of central and local taxation rather than the proposed 
reductions of the sugar duties, arguing that ‘he had not heard of any person who believed 
that sugar would be any cheaper to the poor in consequence’.26 Smith was supported by 
George Hamilton who allied himself with ‘poor middle-class householders’ and claimed 
that urban rates were now more onerous than rural ones.27 Significantly, in his first 
budget of 1874, Northcote denied that there should be an exact equilibrium between 
direct and indirect taxation, and announced that his priority would be the relief of local 
burdens.28 Henceforth, even if the policy meant different things to agriculturists, the 
rhetoric of relief of local grievances could also be plausibly utilized in urban areas. 
A distinctively Conservative means of achieving rate relief was resort to the system 
of grants-in-aid, or Exchequer subventions, for local purposes, which raised fears about 
the autonomy of local authorities from the central state and the weakening of prudence 
among local bodies.29 The rationale was that local spending was dictated by the need to 
provide statutory functions prescribed by parliament, thus justifying central subsidies. In 
this vein, Smith opined that ‘expenditure caused by the direction of parliament … was 
not, properly speaking, expenditure by local authority’.30 Lopes had argued that over 80 
per cent of local taxation was for national purposes, and that the particular bête noire of 
agrarians was the poor law. However, it was the Education Act of 1870, placed on the 
rates, which increased the agitation for rate remission in urban areas. The Education Act 
did much to undermine the Gladstonian opposition to ‘doles’, in practice if not in theory, 
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by increasing the Treasury grant to denominational schools and removing them from the 
rates. The grants-in-aid policy was extended by Northcote during the 1870s so that, by 
1879, annual Exchequer subventions had increased from £2,950,000 to £4,960,000, 
mainly through a 4s per head weekly grant for pauper lunatics and a greater contribution 
towards police and prison costs.31 The principle was modified by George Goschen who, 
in his budgets between 1887 and 1892, replaced the piecemeal policy of grants-in-aid 
with fixed assigned revenues. In 1888 Goschen created the Local Taxation Account, 
transferring the excise duties and half of the probate duties from national to local 
authorities, thereby fulfilling the pledge to make personalty liable for local purposes.32 
Goschen’s reforms raised the total of all kinds of Exchequer subventions to £11,800,000 
by 1892, but failed to resolve definitively the local taxation conundrum, with Liberals 
arguing that realty was now too favourably treated. William Harcourt’s 1894 Budget 
replaced Goschen’s system with a general estate-duty grant, once again reducing the 
contribution of personalty. 
The self-referential difficulty for the framers of Conservative local taxation policy 
was in balancing these demands, sometimes complementary but potentially competing, 
of urban and rural ratepayers. In the Conservative rating worldview, there was neither a 
difference of opinion between the owner and the occupier, nor a dichotomy between rural 
and urban interests, so that the language of rate relief for all forms of real property ought 
to transcend the rural-urban divide. But for many agriculturists the following problem 
remained: whilst rating on houses was related, albeit unequally, to ability to pay, the 
rating of a farmer’s land could be ‘in an inverse ratio to his income’.33 Goschen’s 
proposed wheel and van tax of 1888 –  the so-called ‘veal and ham tax’ – had for 
instance been welcomed by many urban MPs, but was withdrawn after agrarian 
opposition. In 1896 a Conservative Government introduced the Agricultural Relief Act, 
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which derated agricultural land by one half. Although party literature claimed that ‘it 
affects all classes interested in the land’,34 the Liberals could plausibly attack the bill as a 
landowners’ recompense for Harcourt’s increased death duties of 1894, arguing that ‘the 
Conservative Party was nothing if not loyal to all its friends’.35 Not all urban Tories 
shared the equanimity of Frederick Banbury, the choleric MP for Peckham, who claimed 
that the bill would ease migration from rural areas to London, especially as the Liberals 
claimed that the direct cost to London would be £400,000 a year.36 As John Williams 
Benn argued: ‘London loses yearly for the benefit of rural landlords’.37 
It is possible to exaggerate the extent to which the party needed to balance rural 
interests against urban ones, or even the extent to which the two sectors can properly be 
defined as two discrete interests. The party sought to construct a flexible, if contested, 
ratepaying rhetoric which synchronically appealed to the landowner, the small urban 
landlord, and the struggling tenant. Yet the 1896 Act suggests that this polyglot discourse 
of ratepaying, and accommodation of both urban and agrarian interests, could be elusive, 
even unattainable. The success of Conservative local taxation policy from the 1870s 
onwards lay in its flexible application to all ratepayers, but atavistic reactions, however 
understandable, to agricultural unrest did threaten to undermine the plausibility of that 
appeal. 
THE SCLEROSIS OF LOCAL TAXATION IN LONDON 
The situation in London illustrated, albeit in an extreme way, the fiscal crisis of the late-
Victorian state. As early as 1866, a witness had told the Select Committee on 
Metropolitan Local Government that the levels of taxation in the East End had ‘reached 
as much as those districts can bear’.38 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Liberal 
MP for Hoxton, James Stuart, thought that taxation was ‘one of the principal questions 
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before London at the time of the [1892] general election’.39 According to Benjamin 
Costelloe, the chairman of the Local Government and Taxation Committee of the newly-
formed London County Council, the fiscal question was ‘by far the most vital of the 
London questions of today’.40 In a detailed memorandum to Harcourt, Costelloe argued 
that London ‘does constitute a special case, both because of the exceptional conditions 
affecting London’s rents [and] the exceptional magnitude of the coming financial 
demand’.41 The total rate burden in London rose from £2,960,000 at the time of the 1867 
Reform Act to over £11,000,000 in 1900, largely due to the growth in first-tier demands 
which grew from 22 per cent to over 70 cent of this total.42 Expressed as an average 
parish rate in the pound, the figure rose from 3s 9d in 1862 to 6s 2d in 1897, although 
these figures conceals the vast discrepancies of incidence. Table 1 demonstrates that the 
increase in rates occurred across London in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
albeit unevenly and from an unequal base.  
Table 1: General and Poor Rates Raised by Parish, 1877-1897
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The metropolitan rating system remained unhelpfully regressive, falling most 
severely upon those with lower incomes. W. H. Smith estimated that in his Westminster 
constituency rates amounted to 1.5 per cent of an average income, rising to 6 per cent for 
an artisan earning 25s a week,43 representing a significant addition to the already sizeable 
proportion of income that went on rent.44 But the heart of the rating problem in London 
was the absence of equalization so that, despite unequal access to resources, local 
authorities were expected to perform the same statutory duties. Pressure was strongest in 
overcrowded working-class districts such as Bermondsey. As Table 2 shows, the surge in 
rates in Bermondsey occurred at the very time when its rateable value began to stagnate. 
It must also be remembered that lower rateable values per head in working-class areas 
magnified the impact of rate increases. Conversely, pressure was felt least in those 
prospering areas such as Chelsea, where a rising rateable value mitigated rate increases, 
and Islington, where both rates and rateable values grew with a gentle consistency. 
Furthermore, as the chairman of the Metropolitan Board of Works had complained in 
1866, sanitary and architectural improvements to the imperial capital were paid for by the 
London ratepayer without the benefit of the state assistance afforded in other European 
countries.45 The clearest expression of concern over rising rate levels was the dominance 
of vestries by local ratepaying associations, concerned above all with economy and 
retrenchment.46 The metropolitan local taxation crisis was therefore symbiotic with the 
crisis of London local government and the absence of a popularly elected single 
municipality.47  
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The rate burden was further complicated by the labyrinthine assessment system used in 
the capital. Under Goschen’s 1869 Valuation of Property (Metropolis) Act, passed with 
cross-party agreement, a property was assessed every five years on its gross rental value, 
with a deduction (for repairs), usually of 15 per cent, to arrive at the ‘net’ – or rateable – 
value. The bill also restored the practice of compounding, which Disraeli had temporarily 
abolished in 1867 in order to establish a householder suffrage, for houses rated under £20 
in the capital.48 In return for directly paying the rates of their tenants, landlords received 
an allowance of between 15 and 30 per cent, thereby further raising the overall rate 
burden in working-class districts whilst leaving wealthier parishes unaffected. Many on 
the right, however, believed that in practice this lowered the true burden of the rates in 
poorer parishes; one justification for opposing any moves towards rate equalization. 
Compounding was also attacked for encouraging an irresponsible profligacy among the 
working classes, by shielding them from the consequences of their putative demands for 
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increased expenditure, predicting the attack on compounding so central to the 
Conservative municipal backlash of the 1900s. 
Even after Goschen’s 1869 Act had supposedly removed assessment anomalies, the 
twenty-nine local assessment committees interpreted the assessment rules with great 
flexibility, a practice in which they were aided by the absence of any unitary body to 
enforce uniformity. The tendency towards underassessment in some of the wealthier 
areas only increased the pressure in poorer districts to maximize returns. After 1889, the 
LCC attempted to challenge the worst offenders – including an unsuccessful appeal 
alleging that St George, Hanover Square was under-assessed by £200,000, or over 10 per 
cent of its rateable value49 – but a motion allowing the LCC to act as a central valuation 
committee was defeated at an assessment conference in May 1890. The problematic 
question of how to convert weekly rents into a gross rateable value illustrates how erratic 
London rating practices could be. The favoured LCC scale, followed by eleven 
assessment committees, recommended a deduction of one third from the total annual rent 
to arrive at gross value, but Holborn, the City, and Marylebone each allowed deductions 
of up to 40 per cent, whilst seven committees followed the ‘Greenwich’ scale which only 
allowed a deduction of a quarter.50 Such discrepancies were then further magnified by the 
diverse deductions allowed by different committees to arrive at the net – rather than gross 
– rateable value. Rooms let out at the same weekly rent in different areas of London were 
therefore liable to be divergently valued, entrenching the very rating inequalities which 
exacerbated the problem. 
 One bitter source of complaint within the capital was the alleged inequity in the 
distribution of Goschen’s financial arrangements of 1888, which appeared to penalize 
London and other conurbations. This Bill initially proposed to distribute Exchequer 
contributions on the basis of indoor pauperism but in its final form, modified after 
agrarian pressure, subventions were disbursed on the same basis as pre-existing 
Exchequer grants. The LCC’s Statistical Officer, Laurence Gomme, estimated that in 
1895 – excluding contributions towards education – London received about one-sixth of 
all Exchequer contributions whereas before 1888 it had received just over one-fifth. 
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Gomme estimated the resulting annual shortfall at over £500,000.51 The LCC frequently 
passed motions calling for a review of Exchequer funding.52 As Gomme argued, ‘London 
is, relatively to its rateable value and its rates, worse off than any other county borough or 
county in the kingdom in respect of its receipts from the Exchequer Contribution 
Account’.53 Likewise, Stuart impressed upon Harcourt that ‘it is clear that the rest of the 
country has profited largely at the expense of London’.54 For many Progressives, the 
failure of Salisbury’s governments to rectify the perceived injustice was further evidence 
of the pathological hostility of the right to the very existence of the Council. Farrer 
attacked the Tory members for London, ‘watchdogs against what they are pleased to call 
the extravagance of the county council’, asking ‘where were they when they allowed 
other dogs to snap up so large and inequitable a share of the imperial crumbs’!55 Once 
again, the relationship with the centre showed the ambiguity and tensions inherent in 
London’s dual status as metropolis and as imperial capital. 
Sporadically, Conservative thinkers and economists sought to justify the high levels of 
London rates, especially through the pages of the Quarterly Review. One reviewer 
rationalized that ‘rating is a personal charge, and not at all a charge on property … It is 
an annual demand for one year’s use’, adding that ‘Each man’s rental represents as fairly 
as may be his interest in the locality’.56 Another maintained that the working man was 
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‘the lightest taxed person in Europe’, being almost entirely exempt from income tax, and 
therefore warned against any further remission of rates.57 A third held that, instead of 
‘whimpering’ about rate increases, Londoners should ‘be intelligently thankful for the 
economy and the physical results of rates’.58 Some argued that rate rises were 
counterbalanced by the even larger proportionate increase in property values, and that if 
services like free education were to be provided by the community, ‘the occupiers 
individually must be prepared to contribute to the cost’.59 The occasional voice also 
complained that the outcry over rates indicated the absence of working-class restraint, ‘as 
if rates were penalties, and not mere payments for advantages obtained’.60  
 Nonetheless, both political parties could broadly agree that the overall London 
rate burden was both rising and oppressive. The question of incidence – and thereby the 
political solution – was, however, more vexatious. After all, the various interests in a 
typical London property could include landowners, developers, lessees, sub-lessees and 
occupiers. Henry Fawcett held it to be incontrovertible that ‘local rates fall with greatest 
severity upon the occupiers of houses’.61 The celebrated economist and Progressive 
alderman, Thomas Farrer, believed that ‘real incidence is one of the most perplexing 
questions in political economy’, but nonetheless maintained that the burden fell upon the 
occupier, a view which formed the basis of LCC rating policy.62 According to Costelloe, 
even when the landlord directly paid the rates, he could simply transfer the charge to the 
rent, ‘the pull of the market being as a rule against the tenant’, so that ‘the landlords … 
have the London tenants completely at their mercy’.63 Whilst retaining the official party 
view that the onus fell on the owner, many Conservatives representing urban seats, 
including Smith and Balfour, were prepared to admit that, in London at least, much of 
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the burden in practice fell upon the occupier.64 On the other hand, the libertarian wing of 
the party, under the aegis of the Liberty and Property Defence League, maintained that 
rates formed part of the rental bargaining process, and that even if the occupier paid for 
the duration of the lease, the landowner was accordingly obliged to lower the rent.65 
According to one reviewer, ‘a house upon which the rates payable by the occupier are 
high inevitably fetches, ceteris paribus, less rent than one on which the rates are low’.66 
Another commented ‘there is no ground whatever for alleging the existence of any 
considerable injustice as between owners and occupiers’.67 Conservatives were clearly 
unable to agree on a rating doctrine which would unambiguously resolve the question of 
urban incidence. 
THE LCC: REDEFINING THE LONDON TAXATION PROBLEM 
The creation of the LCC in 1888 reconfigured the terms of the local taxation debate. The 
county rate officially from 12 ½d in 1889/90 to 14d in the pound in 1894/5, but the 
adjustments made in 1888 to Exchequer contributions to local finances, plus the 
quinquennial valuation of 1891, render a precise quantification of the impact on the rates 
of the new Council impossible.68 The opacity of the rating system furthermore created 
space for polemical jousting. The Moderates claimed that, after adjustments, the first 
Council alone had been responsible for a rate rise of 2½d,69 whereas Costelloe 
maintained in 1894 that the net rise under the LCC had so far been under a mere penny.70  
Comparisons of LCC spending are further complicated by the loss of the London 
coal and wine duties from 1889 onwards. The coal dues – dating from the late sixteenth-
century – were charged at a rate of 13d per ton, of which 9d went to the Metropolitan 
Board of Works and a further 4d to the City, and were estimated to be worth up to 
£500,000 per year. Critics of the dues argued that they discouraged manufacturing in the 
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capital, depressed the consumption of coal, and financed unelected and unaccountable 
local authorities.71 In late 1886 Randolph Churchill refused Treasury backing to a 
renewal of the dues. Within weeks of the congregation of the new county council, the 
Progressive majority passed a motion approving their abolition. Many Conservatives 
regarded the coal duties as a practical and harmless source of municipal funding, and 
argued that they had in the past paid for schemes such as the Thames Embankment and 
Epping Forest.72 The issue became a cause célèbre amongst metropolitan backbenchers, 
and 23 London Tories voted in favour of a motion by the Peckham MP, Arthur 
Baumann, for their retention in May 1889, with only nine voting against.73 For Robert 
Webster, MP for St Pancras, the metropolis had ‘in many districts nearly reached its limit 
in the matter of direct taxation’, whereas this indirect tax had no discernible impact upon 
coal prices and ‘falls more directly on a man’s means than any other tax that can be 
levied’.74 Cowley Lambert, the MP for Islington East, protested to Salisbury that 
retention of the dues would be ‘decidedly preferable to a large increase in the rates’.75 
Moreover, support for the coal dues could also be interpreted as an adherence to an 
alternative political economy which challenged the nostrums of free trade. Baumann 
ascribed their repeal to an unnecessary genuflection towards the ‘obsolescent principles 
of the Cobden Club’, and claimed that the practical effect would be an additional 4d 
upon the rates.76 One subtext underlying these various protests was that the Conservative 
parliamentary cohort was more directly representative of public feeling than the County 
Council, for as Baumann argued ‘we largely represent the ratepayers and it is the cause of 
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the ratepayers I plead’.77 In November 1891, the Moderate opposition on the LCC 
introduced an unsuccessful Council motion to reinstate the duties.78 
The rising county rate, accompanied by the concurrent upturn in second-tier 
demands as the vestries awoke to their sanitary and civic responsibilities,79 ensured that 
the debates over LCC expenditure entered the public arena. These events contributed to a 
perception of LCC extravagance, which enabled the Conservatives to reclaim the 
languages of ‘economy’ and municipal retrenchment.80 Henry Kimber, the Wandsworth 
MP, echoed the views of many of his colleagues when he claimed that the cause of heavy 
rating in London was that ‘it had chosen to indulge in the luxury of a county council with 
the most extravagant ideas on expenditure’.81 The language of extravagance was a central 
theme of the 1892 LCC election. The Evening News envisioned an all-encompassing 
coalition of ratepayers, inclusive of every social class, asking: 
do the taxpayers of London - from the casual labourer who lives in a single room 
and pays rates in the shape of excessive rents, right through the social structure of 
artizans, small shopkeepers, clerks and professional men, to Belgravian plutocrats 
- wish to pay 3s in the pound?82 
The Moderate candidates at Bethnal Green South West affirmed their opposition to the 
‘ALREADY HEAVY RATES BEING FURTHER INCREASED’, whilst another 
candidate claimed that the rising county rate ‘falls so heavily upon the occupier of small 
shops’, and a third highlighted the ‘reckless extravagance which has swollen the rates’.83  
 During the 1895 LCC elections, announcing that ‘Economy and Efficiency are 
our watchwords’, the Evening News sought to appropriate for the Moderates the anti-
state tenets of retrenchment, once a ‘Radical article of faith’, but now treated ‘with scant 
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courtesy’ by ‘Present-day Radicals’.84 Such perceptions were reinforced by conflating the 
LCC with the activities of the London School Board, which had become synonymous 
with profligacy in Conservative discourse.85 The Standard for instance bemoaned the 
‘enormous load … piled upon the backs of metropolitan ratepayers in so short a time’, 
and attacked the diversity of subjects taught and the provision of free stationery in board 
schools.86 In 1891 George Hamilton complained that the school rate was four times that 
envisaged in 1870, and in 1892 the Conservative MP for Uxbridge, Dixon-Hartland, 
introduced a motion for a Royal Commission to investigate LSB expenditure.87 By 
highlighting the alleged wastefulness of the School Board, many Conservatives sought to 
portray financial extravagance as intrinsic to large, central authorities. Nonetheless, 
Progressive leaders also appealed to their own imagined constituency of the ratepayer. 
Pickersgill and McKinnon Wood asserted that the Progressive programme offered ‘great 
relief to the ratepayers’, whilst Costelloe affirmed that ‘the RATEPAYER is now most 
unjustly taxed … while the man who takes the rent pays nothing’.88 Definitions and 
constructs of the metropolitan ratepayer were clearly mutable and highly contestable 
terrain. 
‘ORIENTAL FINANCE’: CONSERVATIVES AND LCC TAXATION 
POLICY 
The foremost problem facing the Progressive Council was that their ambitious 
programme for municipal renewal necessitated either further rate increases, or the 
introduction of alternative sources of local finance. Unlike provincial municipalities such 
as Birmingham, ownership of utility companies in the capital remained in private hands 
during this period, so denying the LCC a profitable alternative source of revenue.89 
Neither was increasing the loan burden an attractive option, given that the Council 
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inherited outstanding loans amounting to £40,000,000.90 By the mid-1890s, the extent of 
municipal debt in London amounted, in one estimate, to £75 per ratepayer.91 
The only politically palatable option was the search for new revenues, and 
consequently the LCC announced that it would not undertake major improvement 
schemes without a long-term resolution to the fiscal problem. The traditional solution of 
a division of rates between owner and occupier was swiftly rejected. In 1892, the LCC’s 
Local Government and Taxation Committee warned that a mere division of rates 
between owner and occupier would not be sufficient, especially if it failed to extend to 
existing contracts, and recommended instead a measure that would tax capital rather than 
rental values.92 Costelloe further contended that, in the event of division of rates, ‘the 
landlords will still endeavour to defeat … the boon by a general rise of rent’.93 
Subsequently, the council resolved that ‘we do not believe that a mere division of rates 
between owner and occupier could be advantageously carried out under present 
conditions’.94 As an alternative, Costelloe, supported by Farrer, recommended the 
inauguration of a special municipal death duty. This death duty – which had the benefit 
of administrative simplicity – was to be levied on realty, and Costelloe estimated that a 
tax of two and a half per cent would raise a million pounds, or the equivalent of 3d on 
the county rate.95  
 One innovative early proposal to fund specific municipal projects was for the 
introduction of a surtax – otherwise known as betterment – upon landowners whose 
properties would benefit from proposed improvements, such as the Strand-widening or 
the Tower Bridge scheme, to be taxed at three per cent on one-half of the ‘enhanced’ 
value. For many Conservatives, betterment was an anathema, an intrusion of subversive 
American principles imported by the Progressives. Its critics argued variously that 
betterment was an arbitrary impost on potential future value, that public improvements 
were for the benefit of immediate occupiers rather than owners, and that in any case the 
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scheme should be accompanied by compensatory ‘worsement’ for properties which lost 
value as a result of ‘improvements’.96 One Quarterly Review article railed against this 
‘new, un-English, and impracticable, very paltry scheme of so-called betterment’, 
pointing out that that in any case it would scarcely boost the LCC’s income.97 Another 
review denounced betterment as ‘essentially a scheme of rapine and fraud’ and ‘a form of 
Oriental despotism’, arbitrarily imposed upon those living in ‘unhappy contiguity’ to 
areas to be improved.98 A key point of opposition was that owners of property were not 
entitled to the municipal franchise, and so were to be taxed without enjoying the 
protective benefits of citizenship. Henry Kimber, the Conservative MP for Wandsworth, 
denounced the scheme as ‘grotesque and reasonless’.99 However, many of his 
parliamentary colleagues, especially those representing poorer districts, felt a far greater 
affinity with their ratepaying constituents than with distant West End landlords, and thus 
were inclined to regard any proposals to place a small additional charge on owners with 
equanimity. Edwin Hughes, the Conservative MP for Woolwich but a key member of the 
LCC’s Local Government and Taxation Committee, stated that ‘the principle of 
betterment was admirable’ because the burden on occupiers had reached its absolute 
limits.100 Betterment prefaced uncomfortable differences within Conservative ranks over 
the vexed issue of urban taxation. Eventually a bill passed the Lords in 1894, four years 
after its first parliamentary outing, but its provisions were never enforced by the Council, 
by now aware that the principle of betterment was an inadequate answer to the local 
taxation conundrum. 
More far-reaching and radical schemes for solving London’s pressing fiscal crisis 
soon entered the Progressive lexicon, especially a determination to tax the ‘permanent’ 
landowning interests in the metropolis rather than ‘temporary’ residential interest. This 
campaign was initiated by a parliamentary motion by James Stuart in March 1891, which 
called upon the Government to examine the best means of taxing ground-owners, as ‘the 
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owners of real property in London contract themselves out of the rates’.101 Lord 
Hobhouse believed that a small duty on ground rents, the sometimes insignificant charge 
imposed by the ultimate freeholder, would be one means of satisfying demands to place a 
greater burden on owners.102 In itself this was not a particularly controversial measure, 
which received support even from those vestries such as St George, Hanover Square 
where one might have expected to find trenchant opposition.103 However, the taxation of 
ground rents did not go far enough for many Liberals. A delegation of thirty-five Liberal 
MPs and some forty County Councillors protested to Harcourt that such a measure was 
an ‘inadequate alternative for the direct taxation of ground values’.104 Borrowing from 
the theories of Henry George and Fabian theories of ‘rent’, many Progressives came to 
embrace the idea of taxing the socially created ‘unearned increment’, which was 
estimated at anywhere between £7,000,000 and £16,000,000 per annum.105 After the 1892 
LCC elections and the radicalization of Progressivism, Costelloe informed Harcourt that 
‘no palliatives can be of any use’ and asserted that ‘the great “unearned increment” here 
should pay toll to the community’.106 This agitation to tax urban land revived the old 
radical language of monopoly, depicting landlords as speculative parasites who were 
selfishly evading their rightful duties to the wider community.107 One critic arraigned 
London’s great landowners, arguing that ‘no mogul monarch, no Persian satrap, was ever 
harder on a conquered people’.108 Another demanded that landowners such as the Duke of 
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Westminster should ‘disgorge a small percentage of the wealth they did not earn’.109 
Likewise, the Daily Chronicle announced that ‘the landowners reap the golden harvest of 
the common industry’, and denounced the leasehold system in London as ‘the worst land 
tenure in the world’, rendering the metropolis ‘a vast building estate belonging chiefly to 
a few nobles, plus the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the City Corporation, and other 
such powers’.110  
Following Fletcher Moulton, briefly Liberal MP for Hackney South between 1894-
5, some went even further and believed that it was possible to rate land and buildings 
separately, and so levy a heavier rate upon the capital ‘site-value’, whilst also taxing 
vacant land.111 Such a proposal however entailed potentially complicated new schemes of 
assessment, and as Costelloe dryly remarked, ‘it has every merit, except that of being 
easy’.112 A series of competing early proposals envisaged taxation through a series of 
rental deductions on all intermediate beneficiaries going back to the ultimate freeholder. 
But by 1899 the LCC Valuation Department had concluded that ‘the only practicable 
way to tax site values is to adopt a true and scientific basis of assessment for local 
taxation’, replacing rateable value with assessment by site values.113 
A central premise of Conservative resistance to the various Progressive proposals 
was that the peculiarly complex structure of layers of ownership in London meant that 
property was widely diffused. Goschen, replying to Stuart’s 1891 motion, demanded to 
know ‘who are the owners of ground values in London’, and claimed that in the 
metropolis ‘no man can tell exactly whether he is an owner or an occupier’.114 Likewise, 
the moderate Percy Harris demanded to know ‘who are the right persons to be taxed?’115 
                                                          
109
 Sun, 17 Jan. 1894. 
110
 Daily Chronicle, 17 Jan. 1894, 8 Jul. 1895. The paper advocated a combination of Costelloe’s 
municipal death duty and the taxation of vacant land. 
111
 See Moulton, Ground Values. The combined value of land and buildings in the capital was estimated at 
£630,000,000. Lawrence Gomme, using figures drawn up by the LCC’s Valuation Department informed 
the Royal Commission on Local Taxation in 1898 that the main effect of site-value rating would be an 
increase in the rateable value of the City and West-End, but more controversially also suburban areas. 
Gomme estimated increases in the City (3s2d), St James, Westminster (1s2d) and Streatham (1s4d); and 
decreases in Battersea (1s8d), Lambeth (1s7d), Poplar (1s6d) : see Memorandum of Gomme, Minutes of 
evidence to the second report of the royal commission on local taxation, PP 1898, xlii, app. 27, 244-6, 
296-7; and table in London Statistics, 10 (1899/1900), 484-5. 
112
 Bod. Lib., MS Harcourt dep. 187, Costelloe to Harcourt, ‘Memoranda’, 24 Oct. 1893, ff. 85-93 
113
 BLPES, London, COLL MISC 0190, ‘Report by the Valuer and Statistical Officer on the Taxation of 
Site Values’, Jun. 1899. See also Lange, Local Taxation, pp. 34-31. 
114
 Hansard, 3rd ser., cccli. 998-1000 (13 Mar. 1891). Cf. George Beken, The taxation of ground-rents and 
the division of rates between occupiers and owners,(London, 1893). 
115
 Pall Mall Gazette, 4 Apr. 1891. 
22. 
The Chelsea MP Charles Whitmore attacked the ‘vulgar belief’ that all London 
groundowners were wealthy;116 whilst Goschen contended that the owners of ground 
rents were not ‘bloated landlords’ but individuals – especially widows – who considered 
them ‘the safest and best security’.117 It was argued that ground rents were not owned by 
speculators or developers, but were ‘a very popular investment for thrifty people of very 
moderate means’.118 Any schemes to capture the ‘unearned increment’ were dismissed by 
Conservatives as a flawed attempt to capture potential future – rather than actual – 
values, and thus payment would be demanded on ‘a hypothetical basis which has no 
actual existence and may prove by experience to have existed only in the imagination of 
the assessor’.119 One reviewer enquired why land was targeted as ‘the booty of municipal 
marauders’ when it was only ‘one kind among so many thousand kinds of property’, 
before concluding that prejudice and ignorance were determining Progressive policies.120 
Finally, Moderates on the LCC argued that ground rents were already taxed, and pointed 
out that separating capital from rental values would be administratively impossible, and 
preferred instead to proffer demands for personal property to be liable to local taxation, 
or for inhabited house duty – an imperial tax – to be transferred to local authorities.121  
However, many Conservatives were prepared to accept a moderate scheme of 
taxing ground rentals. The Dulwich MP John Blundell Maple informed Salisbury that the 
party’s hostility to betterment and the taxation of ground-rents had alienated many 
metropolitan Conservatives.122 Some in the party even came to advocate leasehold 
enfranchisement as a means of widening property-ownership in the capital, thereby 
encouraging social stability and dignified, responsible citizenship. One reviewer in the 
Quarterly Review railed against the ‘evil system’ of leasehold tenure, which bred 
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ignorance and apathy, and called for the ‘domestic territorial enfranchisement of the 
whole population’.123 In another article, the author elaborated that: 
‘In its present territorial condition there is not in London the most ordinary 
opportunity or foundation for a healthy, active corporate existence; and until this 
sure foundation is conceded the hostility to landlords will continue and increase 
among the population, while improvements will be greviously delayed’.124 
Clearly, a coherent party line on local taxation remained elusive and unobtainable. 
Ultimately, however, the Progressive proposals were thwarted not by Conservative 
opposition but by the failure of the 1892-5 Gladstone ministry to lend practical support to 
such schemes, which prompted protests from aggrieved Progressives. In January 1893 a 
memorandum was sent to Gladstone and Harcourt from the London Liberal and Radical 
Union demanding immediate legislation to ‘relieve the overburdened occupying 
ratepayers of the poorer parts of the metropolis’. Later that year, the London Liberal 
Reform Union resolved that it ‘deeply regrets that no relief has been provided for London 
ratepayers in the budget’.125 Costelloe bemoaned that Harcourt was unwilling to adjust 
London’s proportionate share of Exchequer subventions because ‘he will not touch so 
delicate a subject for fear of the provincial votes’.126  
RATE EQUALISATION 
Whilst seeking novel sources of finance, the Progressives also concurrently attempted to 
address the perennial question of the unequal distribution of the burden of local taxation 
within London, and sought to relieve overburdened occupiers through a measure of rate 
equalization. Pickersgill’s 1889 parliamentary motion to fully equalize the Poor Rate, a 
process begun by Gathorne Hardy’s Metropolitan Poor Act of 1866, was opposed by all 
but three Conservatives, but it signalled that the LCC would make a priority of the 
principle of equalization.127 A motion by Reuben Barrow, the Liberal MP for 
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Bermondsey, to equalize metropolitan rates passed the Commons in February 1893, and 
the measure was reintroduced the following year as a government-backed bill. 
 Conservative reactions to the bill were broadly hostile, especially to its 
redistributive subtext, which seemed to confirm the confiscatory trend – the ‘principles 
of Robin Hood’128 – within Progressivism. The Standard railed that it was a partisan 
measure, under the aegis of the ‘real authors’ at the LCC, ‘for taking toll of that portion 
of London which is governed, and admirably governed, by the Lord Mayor and 
Corporation’.129 Certainly the City of London had most to lose, and the most trenchant 
opposition predictably came from those MPs such as Gibbs, Banbury and Whittaker Ellis 
who represented, or had close ties with the City. Banbury intemperately denounced the 
proposals as ‘oriental finance, worthy of the headsman of a village of Morocco’.130 Some 
Conservatives argued that the bill destroyed the cherished principles of local self-
government. Maple for instance objected that the measure ensured that ‘it was nobody’s 
business and nobody’s responsibility to look after the rates’, and thus would encourage 
profligate vestries in poorer areas to embark on costly schemes of social improvement.131 
Reminiscent of Dickens’ Little Dorritt where financial ruin is ‘nobody’s fault’. Many 
Conservatives, aware that their constituencies would benefit, prefaced their opposition 
with unconvincing claims that they favoured the principle in general but not the 
peculiarities of the measure.132 This political quandary was even more convoluted for 
members representing suburban areas outside the boundaries of the LCC, such as 
Walthamstow and Tottenham, where rates were even higher.133 There was an 
unsuccessful clamour for inclusion in an equalization measure from many of these areas 
on the basis, as the Local Government Journal abstracted, ‘their inhabitants are 
Londoners in the truest sense of the word, for it is in London that they earn their 
living’.134 Although only Isaacson and Benjamin Cohen spoke in favour of equalisation, 
the bill passed the Commons without a division, Shaw-Lefevre remarking cheerfully that 
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‘most of the Tory members for London dare not vote against it’.135 The equalization bill 
evidently embodied many of the conflicting instincts within the Conservative party, 
explaining why the party found it so difficult to integrate various groups behind a 
discourse of ratepaying 
In its final form, the Act imposed a common levy of 6d in the pound to be 
redistributed according to population.136 Before the passage of the bill, the council had 
optimistically resolved that, ‘Whenever this matter is dealt with, it will go far towards 
revolutionising the local government of London’.137 However, as Table 3 shows, the 
effect of equalization was far from dramatic, even though 77 per cent of London’s 
population benefited from the Act, and only 14 of the 43 new local government districts 
were net contributors.138 The Evening News even argued one year later that only landlords 
had in fact profited from equalization, whilst the benefits ‘to the poor exist only on paper 
and in the imaginative brains of radicals’.139 However, the subtext to equalization, which 
many Conservatives continued to deny, was, as Henry Fowler observed, that ‘London is 
one great city, one community, one municipality, having common interests … liable to 
common burdens for the discharge of common duties’.140 In this sense equalization, 
however undramatic, was the logical extension of the creation of the LCC in 1888, a 
reassertion of the essential unity of London. 
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Table 3: Effect of Equalisation upon Total Rate Burden (1896), 
by Parish
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A RATEPAYERS’ PARTY? 
Fiscal questions, whether local or imperial, formed a colourful backdrop to the late-
Victorian political canvas. If we see politics as a constant dialogic process of mediation 
and negotiation, then issues of taxation synchronically highlight both the integrative 
potential and the dangers of conflicting demands inherent within that process. The 
language of defence of ratepayers’ interests, permeated by dialectic notions of 
extravagance and retrenchment, needed to be flexibly defined and continually reshaped. 
From being a monosemous slogan used by agriculturists in the aftermath of the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in 1846, the relief of local and imperial taxation was to become a political 
kaleidoscope, projecting in many directions. Taxation questions raised inconvenient 
questions about the reconstituted self-image and identity of the Conservative party in the 
brave new electoral world after 1867, and forced many Conservatives to engage with the 
self-referential dilemma of defining their immediate constituency. The notion of the 
ratepayer was a diverse and cross-class construct, to which both parties laid claim, and 
attempts to impose too narrow a definition proved unsuccessful The Agricultural Rating 
Act, and later the 1902 Education Act, would suggest that the party leadership 
instinctively continued to look foremost to the counties. This, however, engendered 
fundamental tensions between the hierarchy and many of its elected metropolitan 
backbenchers, who believed that pressing urban needs ought to be privileged. The 
27. 
Equalization bill exposed these torsions, producing for London Tories what Walter Long 
described as ‘a considerable struggle … between what they felt with regard to the Bill 
and what they looked upon as their duty to those whom they represented.’141 The defence 
of groundowners interests, which is so central to Avner Offer’s account of the 
Conservative response, was in reality just one instinct amongst many, and one which had 
to be carefully formulated as one part of the defence of all forms of property to find 
wider resonance. The construction of a systematic party policy on fiscal question was a 
delicate process. 
The creation of the London County Council represented a caesura in the local 
taxation controversy, allowing the languages of economy and retrenchment, previously 
the territory of Gladstonian Liberalism, to pass to the Conservative party. Within a year 
of the inauguration of the LCC, one Conservative MP was insisting that ‘the increase of 
the rates in London is becoming a burning question’.142 Tropes and images of 
extravagance suffused Conservative discourse in municipal elections in the capital. One 
backbencher alleged that ‘the LCC is now almost in the position of Argentina –  
bankrupt’,143 whilst Baumann objected that the Progressives aspired to the ‘moral, 
physical and political reclamation of London at the expense of the rates’.144 In turn, a 
Liberal MP complained bitterly of the ‘extravagant promises of relief to the London 
rates’ pledged by Conservative metropolitan candidates in the 1895 parliamentary 
contest.145 Although one Liberal cabinet minister claimed that ratepayers and taxpayers 
were ‘two entirely different bodies’,146 Conservative thinkers increasingly posited the 
shared interest of these two groups in a reduction in both imperial and municipal 
taxation. For Conservatives, the real distinction was held to be between punitively-taxed 
realty and lightly-taxed personalty.. 
Writing in 1909 in the wake of the abrupt eviction of the Progressive majority on 
the LCC, Charles Masterman satirized suburban ratepayers – ‘the people on the hill’ –  
who considered themselves heavily taxed in order that ‘the people of the plain may enjoy 
good education, cheap trains, parks and playgrounds’. Masterman likened this suburban 
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backlash to ‘that of being suddenly butted by a sheep’.147 That this Edwardian reaction of 
the ratepayers should ultimately benefit the Conservatives was, however, neither a 
natural nor an inevitable development from the perspective of 1900. The discourse of 
ratepaying remained a fiercely contested political terrain in late-Victorian London. 
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